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Abstract
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) play a pivotal role to remote patient monitoring which is one of the main
applications of m-Health. However, WBANs comprise a subset of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and thus, they
inherit the limitations of WSNs in terms of communication bandwidth, reliability, and power consumption that should
be addressed so that WBANs can reach their full potential. Towards this direction, XOR network coding (NC) is a
promising solution for WBANs. Nevertheless, XOR NC is vulnerable to pollution attacks, where adversaries (i.e.,
compromised intermediate nodes) inject into the network corrupted packets that prevent the destination nodes from
decoding correctly. This has as a result not only network resource waste but also energy waste at the intermediate
nodes. In this sense, pollution attacks comprise a serious threat against WBANs (i.e., resource-constrained wireless
networks) that should be addressed so that WBANs can reap the benefits of XOR NC.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose an efficient message authentication code (MAC)-based scheme that provides
resistance against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled WBANs for remote patient monitoring systems. Our proposed
scheme makes use of a number of MACs which are appended to the end of each native packet. Our results show that
the proposed MAC-based scheme is more efficient compared to other competitive schemes for securing XOR NC
against pollution attacks in resource-constrained wireless networks, in terms of communication bandwidth and
computational complexity.
Keywords: Secure XOR network coding, Pollution attacks, MAC-based scheme, Key management, m-Health, WBANs,
Remote patient monitoring
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, advances in Wireless Body Area
Networks (WBANs) have contributed significantly to the
evolution of remote patient monitoring, which is one of
the main applications of m-Health. It is an m-Health
application that could enhance the quality of people’s life
and also reduce the costs of national healthcare systems
[1–3]. For instance, remote patient monitoring could
improve the quality of life of individuals with special
needs, such as people with chronicle diseases, who wish
to lead an independent way of life staying at their own
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home with minimum intervention from healthcare pro-
fessionals. Particularly, remote patient monitoring could
play a pivotal role towards individual’s treatment, proac-
tive actions, and provision of emergency assistance [4–6].
In this context, WBANs are a key component to remote
patient monitoring systems, since they enable continu-
ous monitoring of patient’s physiological parameters and
real-time feedback to the patient and the healthcare pro-
fessional (e.g., doctors) that allow greater mobility and
flexibility to the patient. In addition, healthcare profes-
sionals can have a clearer view of the patient’s status,
thanks to WBANs which are able to obtain data from
the patient’s natural environment during a large time
interval [3, 7].
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WBANs consist of multiple small low-power wireless
devices attached on clothing or on the human body or
even implanted in the human body. These devices, which
are the nodes of a WBAN, are categorized into two types:
sensors and actuators. The sensors measure various vital
signs (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate) or external param-
eters (e.g., motion patterns) and process their readings, if
necessary. Then, they transmit this information to a cen-
tral device, playing the role of the coordinator, directly
or through other nodes (i.e., sensors or actuators) that
act as relays [7–9]. This device, which is more power-
ful than a sensor or actuator, is located on or near the
patient and is responsible to collect all the information
acquired by the sensors or actuators and passes it to
another network (e.g., WLAN, 3G/4G), so that the infor-
mation will reach the remote healthcare professional’s
side (e.g., medical server). Furthermore, the central device
can provide information to the patient or the health-
care professionals (e.g., nurse, doctor), located close to
the patient, via a display/LEDS on it. Moreover, it is
worthwhile to mention that the central device, which
is also called as body gateway (BG), body control unit
(BCU), hub or a sink, in some implementations can be
a smartphone or a personal digital assistant (PDA). On
the other hand, the actuators take actions according to
the information received from the sensors or through
interaction with the patient or the healthcare profession-
als, which is usually handled by the central device as
well [7, 8, 10].
However, WBANs comprise a subset of wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), and thus, they inherit the limitations
of WSNs in terms of communication bandwidth, relia-
bility, and power consumption that should be addressed
so that WBANs can reach their full potential [3, 11–14].
In this sense, the application of network coding (NC)
technology in WBANs has emerged as a promising solu-
tion to address these limitations, since it provides signif-
icant benefits including network capacity improvement,
robustness to packet losses, and lower energy consump-
tion [15–18]. NC was presented for the first time by
Ahlswede et al. in [19] in 2000 and, in contrast to tra-
ditional store-and-forward networks, its core principle is
to allow the incoming packets at the intermediate nodes,
in NC-enabled networks, not only to be routed or repli-
cated but also recoded. Within the few years after 2000,
different approaches of linear NC appeared for wired net-
works [20, 21]. For instance, the approach of random
linear network coding (RLNC) was proposed by Ho et al.
in [22] as a fully distributed approach for performing
NC. According to RLNC, each node selects randomly a
set of coefficients and uses them to make linear com-
binations of the incoming packets. In these approaches,
NC is operated over large finite fields, and thus, they
are not efficient for wireless networks. However, a more
efficient type of NC, based only on XOR operations, was
introduced in [23] and targets applications in wireless
networks [24].
Nevertheless, similar to linear NC-enabled networks,
XOR NC-enabled networks are vulnerable to pollution
attacks, where adversaries (i.e., compromised intermedi-
ate nodes) inject into the network corrupted packets that
prevent the destination nodes from decoding correctly.
Even a small proportion of corrupted packets can quickly
propagate into other packets via re-recoding, occurred at
the intermediate nodes, and lead to infection of a larger
number of packets. This has as a result not only net-
work resource waste but also energy waste at the nodes.
In this sense, pollution attacks comprise a serious threat
against WBANs (i.e., resource-constrained wireless net-
works) that should be addressed so that WBANs can
reap the benefits of XOR NC [24]. Therefore, in this
paper, we propose an efficient message authentication
code (MAC)-based scheme providing resistance against
pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabledWBANs for remote
patient monitoring systems. Our proposed scheme makes
use of a number of MACs which are appended to the
end of each native packet. Our results show that the pro-
posed MAC-based scheme is more efficient compared to
the scheme proposed in [24], in terms of communication
bandwidth and computational complexity. To the best of
our knowledge, the proposed scheme in [24] is the most
competitive scheme in the literature for securing XORNC
against pollution attacks in resource-constrained wireless
networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we give an overview of the background and
related work on XOR NC and secure XOR NC in wire-
less networks. A WBAN scenario in a remote patient
monitoring system is described in Section 3. Section 4
provides the network model of the WBAN scenario,
where XOR NC is applied. In addition, in this section,
we present the adversary model of this XOR NC-enabled
WBAN, as well as the key distribution model which
is adopted by our proposed scheme. In Section 5, our
proposed scheme is provided. Subsequently, the security
analysis of our proposed scheme is given in Section 6.
In Section 7, the performance evaluation of the pro-
posed scheme is analyzed. Finally, Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Background and related work
2.1 XOR network coding in wireless networks
A practical XOR NC scheme which can be applied on
wireless networks was presented for the first time by
Katti et al. in [23]. The proposed scheme, called COPE,
can improve wireless throughput, including more accu-
rate congestion control, better routing, and efficient MAC
protocols. However, COPE takes into consideration only
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wireless networks with resource-unconstrained nodes.
Mostly, COPE is considered as the base of XOR NC
schemes. The idea underlying XOR NC schemes is usu-
ally illustrated using the famous butterfly example [19, 23].
According to the butterfly topology, we consider the net-
work in Fig. 1 including one source node (i.e., node 1), a
few intermediate nodes (i.e., nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5), and two
sink nodes (i.e., nodes 6 and 7). The source node wants
to deliver the native packets x1 and x2 to both sink nodes
(i.e., nodes 6 and 7) through the intermediate nodes (i.e.,
nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5). In this regard, node 4 XORing the
two received packets (x1 and x2) from the two incoming
nodes (i.e., nodes 2 and 3) sends the result of x1 ⊕ x2 to
node 5. Then, node 5 retransmits result of x1 ⊕ x2 to the
sink nodes (i.e., nodes 6 and 7). Finally, the two sink nodes
Fig. 1 XOR network coding based on the butterfly topology
decode the received result of x1 ⊕ x2 and obtain x1 and x2,
as it is depicted in Fig. 1.
2.2 Secure XOR network coding in wireless networks
The first scheme securing XOR NC against pollution
attacks was presented in [24]. In this scheme, a source
node calculates and appends a number of MACs to the
end of each native packet. Each MAC is the output of
a hash function taking as inputs a random number of
codewords of the native packet. According to the pro-
posed scheme, the probability of the corrupted packets
to travel many hops is reduced. In the best case, a cor-
rupted packet can be detected after traveling around 3
hops, and in the worst-case, it can be detected after travel-
ing around 11 hops. Moreover, the authors in [25] propose
a trusted NC scheme, based on COPE, for wireless ad
hoc networks. This scheme allows an intermediate node
to judge whether other nodes are reliable according to
its previous observations. However, their performance
analysis showed that the proposed scheme significantly
outperforms in terms of network throughput. In addi-
tion, the proposed scheme cannot detect a pollution
attack where an adversary has corrupted a packet. In
2012, the authors in [26] proposed a scheme called Code-
Guard. The CodeGuard is a wireless interflow defense
pollution scheme which uses node attestation to detect
adversary nodes. Finally, the authors in [27] proposed an
efficient MAC-signature scheme for securing XOR NC
against pollution attacks. According to their scheme, the
source node generates a number of MACs and a sig-
nature, which are appended to the end of each native
packet and allow the detection of a corrupted packet in the
next hop.
3 WBAN scenario in remote patient monitoring
We consider a WBAN scenario in a remote patient mon-
itoring system as it is shown in Fig. 2, where sensors
are attached on the patient’s clothing or placed on the
patient’s body and measure various vital signs (e.g., blood
pressure, heart rate, respiration rate, cholesterol level)
or external parameters (e.g., patient’s location, motion
patters). In addition, the sensors process their readings,
if necessary, and transmit this information to the BG,
implemented on the patient’s smartphone, through other
relay nodes (i.e., sensors or actuators). The nodes are
interconnected to each other and to the BG through a
short-range wireless technology (e.g., IEEE 802.15.6, Zig-
Bee) [7–9]. The BG then forwards the received data to a
cellular base station (e.g., 4G), through a long-range wire-
less technology (e.g., LTE), so that the data will reach
the medical server at the healthcare professional’s side.
Finally, the actuators of the WBAN play the role of drug
delivery systems. Hence, they inject the medicine when
it is triggered by the healthcare professional through the
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Fig. 2WBAN scenario in remote patient monitoring
central device or immediately when a sensor detects a
problem [7, 10].
4 Models and assumptions
In this section, we provide the networkmodel of the above
WBAN scenario (Section 3), where XOR NC is applied.
Moreover, we provide the adversary model of this XOR
NC-enabled WBAN, as well as the key distribution model
which is adopted by our proposed scheme.
4.1 Network model
Our XOR NC-enabled WBAN can be modeled as a
directed multigraph (S, I, e) which consists of the follow-
ing components, as it is also shown in Fig. 3:
• Source node S: We have a source S (i.e., a sensor
node) which wants to multicast its messages. To
achieve that each message is divided into a sequence
of packets and these packets are multicasted. Each
packet consists of a number of codewords.
• Non-source node set I : This set includes the
intermediate nodes (i.e., relay nodes) and the
destination node (i.e., smartphone) which recode and
decode packets. In Fig. 3, the set of non-source nodes
is represented as: I = {I1, . . . , Ij,D}.
• Link set e: This set consists of all the links in the
network. As a link is defined the connection between
each pair of two nodes. In Fig. 3, the set of links is
represented as: e = {e1, . . . , ew}.
Fig. 3 The network model of our XOR NC-enabled WBAN
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We consider two types of packets: native packets and
coded packets. Native packets are packets generated at
the source node. On the other hand, coded packets are
packets which are encoded and recoded at the source and
intermediate nodes. However, for simplicity, we call them
as packets when it is not required to distinguish them to
native and coded packets. At the setup phase and accord-
ing to the assumption made by the most existing schemes
[28, 29], the source divides each message into a sequence
of native packets and partitions them into generations.
In our model, the source S wants to send a number of
native packets (i.e.,M1,M2, · · · ,Mn) to the destination D.
Each native packetMi, which is divided intom codewords,
can be represented as a row vector as follows:
Mi =
(
mi,1,mi,2, · · · ,mi,m
)
, (1)
where i = 1, · · · , n.
Each codeword stands in a finite field Fp, where p is a
power of prime number. Our model encodes the code-
words over the field of size 2. Typically, each codeword is
256-bit long (log2 p).
Additionally, we denote the coded packet as E, which
can be represented as the following
E = α1M1 ⊕ α2M2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αnMn, (2)
where αi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, · · · , n. The intermediate and
destination nodes use the received coded packets E to
verify the native packets.
4.2 Adversary model
In this paper, we assume that the source node and the des-
tination node are always trusted and there is not any pos-
sibility to be forged. However, the intermediate nodes can
be compromised. A compromised node can play the role
of an adversary that is able to wiretap all the data pack-
ets that are transmitted over the network. The adversary’s
goal is to achieve pollution attack. Moreover, it is consid-
ered that the adversaries have limitations in computation
power, and thus, they can only perform in polynomial
time.
4.3 Key distribution model
We assume that a set of keys are distributed to all partici-
pant nodes in a secure and authenticated manner by a key
distribution center (KDC) according to our key distribu-
tion model. In this section, we provide a brief description
of our key distributionmodel that we have adopted for our
proposedMAC-based scheme against pollution attacks in
XOR NC-enabled WBANs. This key distribution model
has been presented in detail in our previous work [30].
According to our key distribution model, if the keys are
distributed properly, then no coalition of c compromised
nodes can deceive another node. It is shown in [31] that in
order to resist against c compromised nodes, the number
of the keys at the source must be c + 1 times larger than
the number of the shared keys at the relay/destination
nodes. This model allows each verifier to obtain a num-
ber of shared keys in order to verify the coded packets. In
our proposed scheme, this key distribution model assigns
only one key to the intermediate and destination nodes
so that they verify the received coded packet. Only one
key is assigned to each intermediate and destination node,
since in case thatmore than one key is assigned, then there
is the possibility to verify the coded packet more than
once. However, this possibility needs more computational
complexity.
5 ProposedMAC-based scheme
In this section, we present the proposed MAC-based
scheme against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled
WBANs. Our scheme is defined as a triple of probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms (Setup,MAC, Verify):
• Setup: The KDC distributes the required keys to all
nodes, and the source node sets the security
parameters and uses the assigned keys to generate the
corresponding MACs.
• MAC: The source node calculates and appends a
number of MACs to the end of each native packet.
• Verify: Verification is based on the coded packets, the
appended MACs, and the shared keys. If verification
succeeds, the received packets will be accepted and
used for further recoding or decoding. Otherwise, the
received packets are discarded.
The summary of notations is presented in Table 1.
5.1 The construction of the MAC-based scheme
The construction of the proposed MAC-based scheme
consists of the following:
Table 1 Summary of notations
Parameter Meaning
n The number of native packets per generation
m The number of codewords of each native packet
l The number of MACs
p The size of finite field and each codeword
Mi Each native packet
mj Each coded packet
h The hash function
Ki,j The key
idi,j The index of the key
rj The index of u codewords
u The number of codewords used for each MAC
c The number of compromised nodes
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• Setup
Initially, the source node defines the number of
MACs appended to the end of each native packet.
This number of MACs is denoted as l. Then, the
source node chooses randomly a value u which is the
number of codewords that will be used in the
generation process of each MAC. To define the
codewords that will be used in the generation of the l
MACs, the source node makes use of l random
integers r1, r2, . . . , rl, where rj ∈ [1,m] for j = 1, . . . , l.
These random integers are calculated based on a
pseudo-random function. Each rj represents the
indexes of the u codewords that will be used in the
generation process of each MAC. Also, a hash
function h : Fup → Fp, where Fp is a finite field of size
p, is defined by the source node. This hash function
will be used by the source node to create the hash
value of the u codewords. Then, based on the number
of MACs (i.e., l), the KDC distributes l keys
k1, k2, . . . , kl to the source node. Finally, the KDC
selects, based on the key distribution model,
described in Section 4.3, one key from those l keys
and distributes it to each non-source
node.
• MAC
The source node calculates l MACs and appends
them to the end of each native packet. Each MAC is
calculated as follows:
MACi,j = E
(
idi,j, rj, hi,j
)
ki,j , (3)
where i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , l.
Moreover, in Eq. 3, E(.) denotes encryption using the
key ki,j, which is one of the l keys, distributed by the
KDC. In addition, idi,j denotes the index of this key, rj
is the index of u codewords, and hi,j is the output of
the hash function h taking as input u codewords.
More precisely, for XOR NC, the hash function h is
defined as follows:
hi,j = mi,rj,1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ mi,rj,u , (4)
where i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , l.
Then, the source node transmits the following:
(
Mi, idi,1,MACi,1, . . . , idi,l,MACi,l
)
, (5)
where i = 1, . . . , n.
We illustrate an example of the MAC generation in
Fig. 4.
• Verify
Each non-source node (i.e., intermediate and
destination nodes) holds a key which was distributed
by the KDC as it has been mentioned in the Setup
phase. Using this key, the non-source node decrypts
the correspondingMAC of the received coded packet.
Thus, the non-source node obtains the indexes of the
u codewords and the value of the hash function h that
was calculated in the source node. Afterwards, the
non-source node calculates the hash value h′ of the
codewords that correspond to the obtained indexes,
according to Eq. 4, and compares it with the obtained
hash value h. If they are equal, the received coded
packet is considered as uncorrupted and is accepted;
otherwise, the received coded packet is discarded.
6 Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed
scheme in terms of the probability that a corrupted packet
cannot be detected by the next hop and how this proba-
bility can be affected by the number of codewords (u) as
well as the number of MACs (l).
We have considered that the adversary (i.e., the compro-
mised node) knows the distributed key, and thus, based
on Eqs. 3 and 4, he is able to identify which codewords are
Fig. 4 The source node has to calculate and append 4 MACs to the end of the native packetMi , which consists of eight codewords (i.e.,mi , . . . ,m8).
To generate the 4 MACs, a pseudo-random function is used firstly to generate four random values (i.e. r1, . . . , r4), one for each MAC. Based on these
random values, the source node defines the indexes of the codewords, which will be the input to the hash function h in order to calculate the
corresponding hash values h(1), . . . , h(4)
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verified by the corresponding MAC. Hence, he can cor-
rupt these codewords and generate a false MAC for the
corrupted packet. However, the corrupted codeword can
be detected by the next node with a high probability.
Theorem 1. The probability that a corrupted codeword
in one MAC is not detected by the next node is not greater
than
(
1 − um
)l−1.
Proof. In our proposed scheme, each MAC verifies the
integrity of u codewords out of m codewords. Therefore,
the probability that each codeword can occur in oneMAC
is um . However, the probability that this codeword does not
occur in other MACs is calculated as follows:
poccur =
(
1 − um
)l−1
(6)
Consequently, if an adversary corrupts a codeword of a
MAC, then the probability that the corrupted codeword
will not be detected by the next node is given by Eq. 6.
From Theorem 1, it is clear that the probability of a cor-
rupted packet not to be detected by the next node is given
by Eq. 6 as well. In Fig. 5, based on Eq. 6, we illustrate
this probability in terms of the number of codewords for
different number of MACs. As it is shown in Fig. 5, by
increasing the number of codewords, the probability of
a corrupted packet not to be detected by the next node
decreases.
In addition, the probability of a corrupted packet not
to be detected by the next node is also affected by the
number of MACs.
Theorem 2. By increasing the number of MACs, the
probability that a corrupted packet not to be detected by
the next hop decreases.
Proof. Suppose that the total number of compromised
nodes is c. Consequently, the adversary can totally obtain c
keys. Thus, the probability that the adversary can decrypt
oneMAC of the coded packet is denoted as pk and defined
as follows:
pk =
c
l (7)
Hence, adopting Eq. (12) proposed in [24], the probabil-
ity that the adversary, holding c keys, can decrypt cMACs
out of the l MACs, is the following:
pdec(c) =
(
l
c
)
pck
(
1 − pk
)l−c (8)
where c  l.
As a result, the probability that a corrupted packet
not to be detected by the next hop is given by Eq. 8
as well. According to this equation, it is clear that by
increasing the number of MACs, the probability that the
corrupted packet not to be detected by the next hop
decreases.
In Fig. 6, based on Eq. 8, we illustrate this probability
in terms of the number of MACs for different number of
compromised nodes.
Fig. 5 Corrupted packet non-detection probability in terms of the number of codewords
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Fig. 6 Corrupted packet non-detection probability in terms of the number of MACs
7 Performance evaluation
In this section, we analyze the performance of our MAC-
based scheme in terms of communication bandwidth and
computational complexity.
7.1 Communication bandwidth
To calculate the communication overhead of our pro-
posed scheme, we take into consideration (a) the num-
ber of codewords of the native packet, (b) the l MACs
appended to the end of each native packet, and (c) the
l key indexes appended to the end of each native packet
as well.
Each native packet hasm codewords and each codeword
requires log2 p bits. Thus, the bit length of each native
packet ism ∗ log2 p bits.
On the other hand, according to Eq. 3, each MAC con-
sists of a hash value, a random number, and the key index.
Based on Eq. 4, the hash value is the XOR result of u
codewords and thus, it requires log2 p bits.
Moreover, the random number, used to identify the
indexes of the codewords, requires log2m bits. Finally,
the index of the key requires log2 |l| bits. Consequently,
the bit length of lMACs is l ∗ (log2 p+ log2 m+ log2 |l|)
bits.
In addition, each key index appended to the end of
each native packet requires log2 |l| bits. Therefore, the bit-
length of l key indexes is l∗(log2 |l|) bits. However, similar
to [24], in order to reduce the length of the coded packets
in our scheme, only one key index can be appended to the
end of each native packet.
Thus, our MAC-based scheme has the following com-
munication overhead:
l ∗ (log2 p + log2 m + log2 |l|)+ log2 |l|
m ∗ log2 p
(9)
Assuming that the number of MACs (i.e., l) is con-
stant, m is equal to 256, and p is 256-bit long, the
value of log2 |l| and the value of log2m are negligible
compared to the value of log2 p. Hence, from Eq. 9,
the communication overhead is calculated as lm , which
means that our scheme has the same communication
overhead as the proposed scheme in [24]. However, our
proposed scheme can detect the corrupted packets earlier
(i.e., next node), and thus, communication bandwidth is
saved.
7.2 Computational complexity
According to Eqs. 3 and 4, (u − 1) XOR operations
are needed to generate each MAC in our scheme.
Thus, the generation of l MACs requires l ∗ (u − 1)
XOR operations. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme
in [24] requires l ∗ u XOR operations to generate
l MACs.
Moreover, to verify a coded packet in each non-source
node, (u− 1) XOR operations are required in our scheme,
since each non-source node calculates the hash value of
the codewords that corresponds to the obtained indexes,
according to Eq. 4. On the other hand, the scheme pro-
posed in [24] requires l∗uXOR operations for verification.
In Fig. 7, we illustrate the number of XOR operations
required to verify the coded packet in our scheme and
the scheme proposed in [24]. It is worthwhile to men-
tion that, in contrast to the scheme proposed in [24],
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Fig. 7 The number of XOR operations required to verify a coded packet in terms of the number of codewords in our proposed scheme and the
scheme proposed in [24]
our scheme does not depend on the number of MACs
(i.e., l).
Table 2 summarizes the number of XOR operations
required for MAC generation and verification in our pro-
posed scheme and the scheme proposed in [24]. Accord-
ing to Table 2, our scheme requires less XOR operations
in total than the scheme proposed in [24], and thus,
our scheme is more efficient in terms of computational
complexity.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have been proposed an efficient MAC-
based scheme providing resistance against pollution
attacks in XOR NC-enabled WBANs for remote patient
monitoring systems. Our proposed scheme makes use
of a number of MACs which are appended to the end
of each native packet. Our results show that the pro-
posed MAC-based scheme is more efficient compared to
the scheme proposed in [24], in terms of communication
bandwidth and computational complexity. The proposed
scheme in [24] is the most competitive scheme in the lit-
erature for securing XOR NC against pollution attacks in
resource-constrained wireless networks. Particularly, our
scheme saves communication bandwidth, since it detects
corrupted packets in the next hop with high probabil-
ity, and its computational complexity is lower because it
Table 2 Number of XOR operations
Proposed scheme [24]
MAC l ∗ (u − 1) l ∗ u
Verify u − 1 l ∗ u
requires less XOR operations than the scheme proposed
in [24].
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